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Capacity, Control, or Both 
– Which Aspects of Working Memory Contribute 
to Children’s General Fluid Intelligence?
Abstract: Starting from the assumption that working memory capacity is an important predictor of general fluid 
intelligence, we asked which aspects of working memory account for this relationship. Two theoretical stances are 
discussed. The first one posits that the important explanatory factor is storage capacity, roughly defined as the number of 
chunks possible to hold in the focus of attention. The second one claims that intelligence is explained by the efficiency of 
executive control, for instance, by prepotent response inhibition. We investigated 96 children at the age between 10 and 13. 
They completed a version of the n-back task that allows assessment of both storage capacity and inhibitory control. They 
also completed Raven’s Progressive Matrices as the fluid intelligence test and the Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing 
Production, for control purposes. We found that Raven’s scores correlated negatively with the number of unnecessary 
responses to irrelevant stimuli but they did not correlate with the number of signal detections. We conclude that children’s 
fluid intelligence depends on inhibitory control, with no relationship with storage capacity.
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Working memory is believed to be not only 
“a memory”, that is to say, one of several modules involved 
in information storage and retrieval, but also the central 
“engine” for human higher-order cognition (Hambrick, 
Kane, & Engle, 2005; Nęcka & Orzechowski, 2005). 
Numerous studies demonstrated that efficiency of this 
“engine” accounts for individual differences in reading 
skills (Daneman & Carpenter, 1880; Henry, Messer, 
& Nash, 2013), verbal comprehension (Daneman & 
Green, 1986; Daneman & Merikle, 1996), mathematical 
skills (De Smedt, Janssen, Bouwens, Verschaffel, 
Boets, & Ghesquière, 2009), problem solving (Nęcka & 
Orzechowski, 2005; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 
2007), and – last but not least – general fluid intelligence, 
Gf (Chuderski & Nęcka, 2012; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; 
Nęcka, 1992). Some authors went as far as claiming that 
working memory capacity (WMC) is almost synonymous 
with Gf (Colom, Rebollo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa, & 
Kyllonen, 2004; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990), although 
available empirical evidence is not that convincing 
(Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005). Nevertheless, there are 
no doubts that general fluid intelligence, understood as the 
domain-general ability “to reason, plan, solve problems, 
think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly 
and learn from experience” (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 13), is at 
least moderately, and sometimes strongly, correlated with 
various measures of WMC. It is estimated that WMC and 
Gf share from at least 50% (Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 
2005) up to 70% (Oberaurer, Schultze, Wilhelm, & Süß, 
2005) or even 90% (Colom et al., 2004) of variance. The 
relevant studies are mostly correlational so it is hard to 
decide about the direction of causation, although cognitive 
psychologists usually believe that processes involved in 
working memory functioning constitute the substrate of Gf 
(see: Oberauer et al., 2007).
Having established that WMC is one of the strongest 
predictors of Gf, researchers focused on the more detailed 
issue, namely, which aspects of working memory contribute 
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to intelligence. Working memory is a construct referring 
to complex cognitive machinery, consisting of the central 
executive, active and passive storage modules for verbal 
material, as well as active and passive storage modules 
for nonverbal content (Baddeley, 1986; 2002; Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974; Miyake & Shah, 1999). It is therefore 
necessary to understand which of its components are 
important for intelligence, and why. From the perspective of 
the psychology of individual differences, two explanations 
of the WMC and Gf relationship have been proposed. 
Proponents of the first account (e.g., Cowan et al., 2005; 
Cowan, Morey, Chen, & Bunting, 2007) emphasize the 
role of storage capacity, understood as the number of items 
possible to be maintained and processed within the focus 
of attention. It is well established that human short-term 
storage capacity is severely limited, since we are able 
to keep in the primary memory, also called the focus of 
attention, between two and six chunks of information, 
the average capacity being about four (Cowan, 2001). It 
is claimed that the more capacious focus of attention the 
higher the cognitive abilities of a person, because thinking 
and problem solving presumably need permutation of 
objects held in the active memory. A variation of the 
“capacity approach” amounts to the thesis that objects 
held in the primary memory must be bound temporarily 
to task-relevant structures, such as the words a phrase 
consists of (Oberauer et al., 2007; Oberauer, Süβ, 
Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2008). Such temporary bindings 
must be quickly substituted by the new ones in order to 
allow further cognitive processing. For instance, verbal 
comprehension needs quick formation and replacement 
of temporary bindings referring to the syntactic and 
semantic characteristics of the successively incoming 
messages. It is claimed that individual cognitive ability 
of a person depends on the number of elements that can 
be bound temporarily in the primary memory according 
to the requirements of the task at hand. Proponents of the 
second account (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004; Engle, Tuholski, 
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kane & Engle, 2002; Kane, 
Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007) underscore the role 
of attentional control, roughly reminding Baddeley’s 
(1986) idea of the central executive. It is claimed that 
storage capacity does not suffice for effective intellectual 
functioning if attention is not focused on the relevant 
chunks of information. This line of reasoning is closely 
related to the theoretical accounts of Gf in terms of the 
efficiency of executive control (e.g., Friedman, Miyake, 
Corley, Young, DeFries, & Hewitt, 2006; Gray, Chabris, & 
Braver, 2003).
The “capacity approach” and the “control approach” 
(Chuderski & Nęcka, 2012) are not only two competing 
accounts of the WMC-Gf relationship but also two strands 
of theorizing on the nature of WMC itself. It is important 
to realize that the term “capacity” is usually used in the 
literature in its broad sense, meaning the general efficiency, 
or efficacy, of the mental machinery of working memory. 
This general efficiency probably depends on both the size 
of the focus of attention and the effectiveness of attentional 
control. Joint contribution of these two factors defines 
individual level of the compound cognitive skill called 
“working memory capacity”, or WMC. In its narrow sense, 
the word “capacity” refers only to the storage aspect of 
working memory. Within the original framework outlined 
by Alan Baddeley (1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), 
capacity in the narrow sense may be defined as the number 
of elements possible to be held and maintained by the 
articulatory loop or by other modules responsible for short-
term storage. Analogically, within the model suggested by 
Nelson Cowan (2001), capacity understood in the narrow 
sense may be defined as the size of the focus of attention. In 
this paper we use both meanings, depending on the context. 
If we refer to the WMC-Gf relation, we use the broader 
meaning, but if we refer to particular theoretical accounts 
of the WMC-Gf link, we use the word “capacity” in the 
narrow sense.
Going back to the nature of the WMC-Gf link, it is 
difficult to judge which of the two competing accounts 
is more compatible with empirical results. Majority of 
relevant studies used complex span tasks as measures of 
working memory capacity, such as the OSPAN task (e.g., 
Kane & Engle, 2003; Turner & Engle, 1989). These tasks 
need both capacity and control, and researchers have 
limited opportunities to split those two aspects of working 
memory in order to decide which of them contributes 
to particular cognitive skills. Additionally, the mere 
complexity of span tasks make them likely to correlate with 
scores obtained with intelligence tests, which are also rather 
complex cognitive tasks.
In a series of six experiments with normally 
functioning adult participants, we (Chuderski & Nęcka, 
2012) tried to confront these two lines of theorizing. 
Instead of relying on complex span tasks, we used 
several versions of a relatively simple task called n-back 
(Kirchner, 1958; McErlee, 2001). This task requires 
constant updating of the contents of working memory, 
being a good estimate of the capacity aspect of WM. The 
logic of n-back consists in continuous presentation of 
items (e.g., numbers, figures) that appear and disappear 
one by one. The task is to decide if the currently presented 
item has already appeared n items back. In the following 
hypothetical stream of stimuli: 46, 58, 32, 58, and so forth, 
the last item 58 has already appeared two items back. The 
n number is usually manipulated from one to four, thus 
allowing estimation of accuracy of participants’ decisions 
in relation to the level of difficulty of the task’s conditions. 
In some versions, the n-back task also needs efficient 
executive control, since certain items may reappear at 
wrong positions. For instance, if the n number is defined 
as 2, the following stream: 46, 58, 58, 32, and so forth, 
includes a lure, which is the item 58 reappearing too early. 
Sometimes lures appear too late, i.e., after the predefined 
n number. Participants must abstain from responding to 
lures in order to avoid errors, although they are “tempted” 
to press a button in response to an ostensibly valid signal. 
Abstaining from lures needs efficient executive control, 
particularly the function of prepotent response inhibition 
(Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, the n-back task allows 
assessment of both capacity and control aspects of working 
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memory. The former is assessed on the basis of accuracy of 
target detection, whereas the latter is estimated on the basis 
of lure neglect. We found that storage capacity explained 
as much as 62% of variance of Gf, whereas executive 
control explained only 13% (Chuderski & Nęcka, 2012). 
Thus, both aspects of working memory, storage and control, 
appeared important but the former outstandingly surpassed 
the latter. Another study (Chuderski, Tarady, Nęcka, & 
Smoleń, 2012), carried out with the structural modeling 
approach, revealed that storage capacity explained as much 
as 70% of Gf variance. Attention control explained about 
25% of Gf variance but its significance disappeared when 
storage capacity was statistically controlled for.
In this paper, we address the same question pertaining 
to children aged 10-13. A rationale for this study originates 
from the assumption that the proportion of Gf variance 
explained by two competing factors – storage capacity 
and executive control – might depend on the dynamics 
of cognitive development. It has been demonstrated that 
executive control develops very quickly between three 
and seven years of age (Białecka-Pikul, 2012; Eisenberg, 
Duckworth, Spinard, & Valiente, 2012; Rothbart & Rueda, 
2005; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005) but it is far from 
stabilization at the pre-adolescent period (Casey, Getz, & 
Galvan, 2008). There are reports suggesting that executive 
control may develop until the period of young adulthood, 
i.e., roughly up to 25 years of age (Casey et al., 2008). 
There is also ample evidence that adolescence is a period 
of life during which such abilities as impulse control or 
delay of gratification are still immature (Steinberg, 2007, 
2010). If executive control is not properly developed at 
the pre-adolescent and adolescent periods of development, 
huge inter-individual differences in EF must occur among 
school-age children (Duckworth, Gendler, & Gross, 
2014). If so, one should expect that children’s individual 
development of executive control would be a strong 
predictor of Gf, maybe stronger than among normally 
functioning adults. We hypothesize that fluid intelligence 
of children at the age 10-13 would depend on both storage 
capacity and executive control. The question of relative 




We investigated 96 schoolchildren, aged 10–13, 
M = 12.03, SD = 1, 51 girls and 45 boys. They were 
recruited from two secondary schools in Bialystok, Poland. 
Written informed consent forms have been obtained from 
parents or legal guardians of participants. The children had 
free choice concerning their participation in the experiment.
Materials
The n-back task
We used the figural version of the n-back task, the 
same as in Experiment 5 reported by Chuderski and Nęcka 
(2012). The task consisted in serial presentation of simple 
figural symbols, such a star, a triangle, an arrow etc., each 
approximately 2.5 × 2.5 cm in size. Stimuli remained at the 
screen for 1500 ms and were masked for 300 ms. The task 
consisted of four series. In every series we presented 88 
stimuli, so altogether there were 352 stimuli showed to each 
participant, plus some training stimuli before each series. 
Sixteen out of 88 stimuli in every series were presented 
twice. The participants were supposed to decide whether 
the second presentation took place n elements after the 
first one. The predefined n number equaled two. Hence, 
participants were instructed to press a space bar if and only 
if the currently presented symbol had already appeared 
two items back. For instance, if a symbol reappeared in 
the stream of stimuli separated by just one other symbol 
(e.g., star, triangle, star again) this repeated symbol became 
a target that required detection and speedy response 
with the space bar. If an item reappeared too early, i.e., 
immediately after its first presentation, or too late, i.e., 
separated by two symbols instead of just one, it was to 
be ignored. Stimuli reappearing too early (n = 1) or too 
late (n = 3) were classified as “lures”, since their function 
was to “tempt” participants to respond with no required 
accuracy. There were eight targets, four n = 1 lures, and 
four n = 3 lures in every series. Majority of stimuli (72 
in every series) did not reappear shortly after their first 
presentation1. These stimuli may be termed “noise”, since 
they were to be ignored. If a participant responded to such 
stimuli, he/she committed the error of false alarm. Also, 
if a participant pressed the space bar in response to the 
stimuli that reappeared at “wrong” positions, i.e., n=1 or 
n=3, he/she earned the error of lure detection. We registered 
accuracy scores for each participant, defined as the 
proportion of correct signal detections and the proportion 
of erroneous lure detection. We also registered reaction time 
of every response but these data will not be analyzed and 
reported here.
Raven’s Progressive Matrices
We used Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, 
& Raven, 1983) in the Polish adaptation (Jaworowska 
& Szustrowa, 2010) as a tool to assess children’s fluid 
intelligence. This test consists of 60 items divided into five 
series. Each series consists of 12 abstract reasoning tasks 
arranged according to their increasing difficulty (the rule 
of progression). All items are based on Spearman’s (1927) 
idea of eduction of relations, since they can be solved only 
if a person is able to grasp abstract relations between figural 
symbols. The test takes 40 minutes to complete.
Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production
In order to assess if the hypothesized relationships 
would be specific to intelligence, we decided to use another 
ability test. We chose the Test for Creative Thinking – 
Drawing Production, created by Urban and Jellen (1986) in 
the Polish adaptation by Matczak, Jaworowska & Stańczak 
(2000). This test consists of an A4 sheet of paper, on which 
1 Although repetition of stimuli was inevitable taking into account the length of each series.
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a frame and six small elements are drafted. The instruction 
says that an artist has not finished the drawing and therefore 
the participant must complete it on his/her own. Fifteen 
minutes maximum is allowed for the test completion. 
Scoring is based in the formal and objective criteria, such 
as the number of continuations, completions etc.
Procedure
Participants took part in three testing sessions. 
During the first session they completed the n-back task, 
working in the school computer room. There were 6–7 
children working simultaneously under the experimenter’s 
supervision, in the conditions that ensured silence and lack 
of distraction. Each of the three segments of the task was 
preceded by short training series. The whole procedures 
took about 30 minutes to complete, including instruction, 
training, and technical breaks between series. The second 
session served for testing with the TCT–DP, and the third 
one allowed testing with Raven’s matrices. The sessions 
were separated by periods lasting from two to three weeks, 
and the whole procedure of data gathering took about three 
months altogether.
Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the following 
variables: the mean proportion of errors in the n = 1 
condition (ERR n = 1), the mean proportion of hits in 
the n = 2 condition (HIT n = 2), and the mean proportion 
of errors in the n = 3 condition (ERR n = 3). Statistics 
concerning Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) and 
the Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production 
(TCT–DP) are also included. We can see that the mean hit 
rate slightly exceeded 0.50, which was the guess point. 
It means that the average accuracy, measured with the 
proportion of properly detected signals, was not very high, 
although the mean hit rate (0.60) differed significantly from 
the guess point: t(1,95) = 5.45, p < .001). As to error rate, 
we found quite high proportion of false alarms (0.48) in the 
n = 1 condition, and quite low proportion of false alarms in 
the n = 3 condition. Mean error rate in the n = 1 condition 
did not differed statistically from the point of random 
decision: t(1,95) = -0.74, p = .46, whereas the mean error 
rate in the n = 3 condition did: t(1,95) = -8.54, p < .001. 
The observation that mean accuracy measures in the n = 1 
and n = 2 conditions were not quite impressive made us 
decide to conduct further analyses not only with the whole 
sample but also with participants selected on the basis of 
their high accuracy scores. As to the ability measures, both 
RPM and TCT–DP brought about the average results that 
seemed typical for the population from which our sample 
was recruited.
The indices of skewness and kurtosis shown in Table 1 
suggest possible deviation from the parameters of normal 
distribution. The K-S test revealed that all dependent 
variables included in Table 1 were not normally distributed. 
Error rate indices in the n = 1 and n = 3 conditions were 
slightly left-sided and the hit rate indices in the n = 2 
condition was a bit right-sided. These observations suggest 
that the majority of participants responded with acceptable 
accuracy, so lack of normality of distribution resulted 
from high error rate committed by the minority. In order 
to eliminate statistical problems connected with normality 
of distribution, all dependent variables were subjected to 
logarithmic transformation.
In Table 2 we report zero-order correlation 
coefficients. We found only one significant correlation 
between scores in Raven’s matrices and n-back 
performance measures. It appeared that higher scores in 
RPM were associated with relatively low proportion of 
false alarms in the n = 1 condition (r = -0.36, p < 0.001). 
Correlations pertaining to the n = 2 and n = 3 conditions, 
although consistent in sign with our predictions, did not 
exceed the significance levels. Analogical correlation 
between error rate in the n = 1 condition and the creativity 
test was significant, too, albeit a bit weaker (r = -0.27, 
p = 0.01). Table 2 also shows significant positive 
correlation coefficients between three measures of n-back 
performance. We can see that error rate indices in the n = 1 
and n = 3 conditions were correlated at the level of r = 0.53, 
p < 0.001, which is not surprising since both measures 
reflect inhibitory control. Interestingly, the hit rate in the 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
N Min Max Mean SD Skewness  Kurtosis
ERR n = 1 96 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.32 0.09 -1.36
HIT n = 2 96 0.22 1.00 0.60 0.18 -0.36 -0.62
ERR n = 3 96 0.00 0.94 0.32 0.21 0.58 -0.33
RPM 96 14 55 42.27 7.36 -1.26 3.16
TCT–DP 96 8 57 28.08 7.36 0.17 -0.80
Note:
ERR – error rate, proportion of false alarms 
HIT – hit rate, proportion of properly detected signals
RPM – Raven’s Progressive Matrices
TCT–DP – Urban and Jellen’s Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production
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n = 2 condition correlated positively with the error rate in 
the n = 3 condition (r = 0.49, p < 0.001) but not in the n = 1 
condition (r = 0.04, p < 0.74). The former result suggests 
that, in the n = 3 condition, participants might have 
sometimes treated lures as signals, thus committing false 
alarms without awareness of responding to lures instead 
of signals (see: Chuderski & Nęcka, 2012, for similar 
interpretation). The latter finding suggests that participants 
generally did not adopt the strategy of pressing the space 
bar all the time “just in case”. If they did, we should expect 
significant positive correlation between error rate in the 
n = 1 condition and hit rate in the n = 2 condition, which 
was not the case. Nevertheless, some participants could 
adopt such a strategy, which is reflected by not very good 
indices of accuracy, reported in Table 1.
In order to check whether the relationships reported 
in Table 2 pertain to each ability measure if another one is 
controlled for, we conducted a series of partial correlation 
analyses. The partial correlation between RPM scores and 
error rate in the n = 1 condition did not change significantly 
when TCT–DP scores were controlled for (r = -0.35, 
p < 0.001). Analogically, the partial correlation between 
TCT–DP scores and error rate in the n = 1 condition 
(r = -0.25, p < 0.01) was almost identical with the zero-order 
correlation. This pattern of relationships is understandable 
taking into account that scores in the intelligence and 
creativity tests were not mutually correlated (see Table 1).
Next, we built a regression model in which Raven’s 
scores were defined as the dependent variable and three 
accuracy scores of the n-back task served as predictors. We 
found the following parameters of the model: R = 0.408, 
R2 = 0.166, corrected R2 = 0.139, F(3,92) = 6.107, 
p = 0.001. We also found the following beta coefficients: 
ERR n = 1, ß = -0.347, p < 0.004; HIT n = 2, ß = 0.201, 
p = 0.082; ERR n = 3, ß = -0.044, p = 0.746. From these 
results we can draw a conclusion that inhibition of impulsive 
albeit wrong responses in the n = 1 condition is really 
a significant predictor of Gf. As to detection of signals in 
the n = 2 condition, the results seem discouraging, although 
the p value in the regression model appeared marginally 
significant (ß = 0.201, p = 0.082). We also computed 
analogical regression analysis with TCT – DP scores as 
the dependent variable. This time the model was not fit 
well enough: R = 0.270, R2 = 0.073, corrected R2 = 0.043, 
F(3,92) = 2.420, p = 0.071. The beta index for the error rate 
in the n = 1 condition slightly exceeded the significance level 
(ß = -0.248, p = 0.051). Thus, inhibitory control reflected 
by low error rate in the n = 1 condition appears to predict 
creativity with disputable strength, while its predictive power 
pertaining to Gf seems unquestionable.
Taking into account the possibility that some 
participants could adopt the strategy of pressing the 
bar “just in case”, thus emitting both correct responses 
in the n = 2 condition but also false alarms in the n = 1 
condition, we decided to repeat the correlational analyses 
with participants characterized by high accuracy scores. 
We selected participants whose hit rate in the n = 2 
condition significantly exceeded the guess point of 
0.50. The selection criterion was the hit rate higher or 
equal 0.64, because we found that the 95% confidence 
interval of remaining above the chance level was 0.1359 
(0.50 + 0.1359 ≈ 0.64). Only 45 participants remained 
in the selected subsample, which is a bit problematic 
as to degrees of freedom and restriction of variance. 
Nevertheless, the correlation coefficients reported in 
Table 3 seem worth the risk caused by sample size 
reduction. We can see that the Raven scores correlation 
with error rate in the n = 1 condition was stronger than 
in the whole sample (r = -0.42, p = 0.004 and r = -0.36, 
p < 0.001, respectively), although the p value is a bit 
weaker due to reduced sample size. We can also see that 
RPM scores were negatively correlated with error rate 
in the n = 3 condition (r = -0.33, p = 0.03), which means 
that high IQ participants tended to avoid impulsive 
responding in this relatively demanding condition. It must 
be underscored that selection of participants on the basis 
Table 2. Zero-order correlation coefficients for the whole sample, N = 95
ERR n = 1 HIT n = 2 ERR n = 3 RPM TCT–DP


















RPM – – – – .10
p = .33
Note:
ERR – error rate, proportion of false alarms 
HIT – hit rate, proportion of properly detected signals
RPM – Raven’s Progressive Matrices
TCT–DP – Urban and Jellen’s Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production
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of their accuracy scores must have resulted in restriction 
of variance, which normally makes correlation coefficients 
weaker rather than stronger. Therefore, these findings 
seem quite convincing as to the claim that general fluid 
intelligence is predicted by efficient inhibitory control. 
Remarkably, no significant correlation with hit rate in the 
n = 2 condition occurred (r = 0.03, p = 0.85). Table 3 also 
demonstrates that none of the n-back task performance 
indices was related to creativity level, since all correlation 
coefficients with TCT–DP lost their significance after 
selection of participants on the basis of the accuracy scores. 
It seems, therefore, that the findings reported in Table 2 
and Table 3 are specific to fluid intelligence, with no 
generalization on other dimensions of cognitive abilities.
Discussion
In an attempt to find out which aspects of working 
memory account for general fluid intelligence (Gf), we 
conducted an experimental study with the participation 
of 96 school-age children. The participants completed a 
special version of the n-back task, which required detection 
of signals, i.e., stimuli repeated at the valid n = 2 position, 
and neglect of lures, i.e., stimuli repeated too early (n = 1) 
or too late (n = 3). We hypothesized that high proportion of 
signal detection would reflect large capacity of the focus 
of attention (Cowan, 2001), whereas low proportion of 
responses to lures would reveal the efficacy of executive 
control, particularly – strength of the prepotent response 
inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000). These two aspects of 
working memory efficiency – capacity and control – 
showed their contribution to Gf in previous studies with 
adult participants, the former seeming more important 
than the latter (Chuderski & Nęcka, 2012). We found 
that Gf, assessed with Raven’s matrices, did not enter in 
any relationship with the proportion of signal detection. 
Conversely, the proportion of false alarms in the n = 1 
condition showed significant negative correlation with 
Raven. We can therefore conclude that the capacity aspect 
of working memory turns out to be insignificant for Gf, 
whereas the control aspect is an important predictor of Gf, 
accounting up to 20% of its variance. So, the capacity vs. 
control debate obtained empirical evidence favoring the 
executive control stance, as far as children’s intelligence 
is concerned.
Although our findings are compatible with results 
reported by other authors (e.g., Hasher, Lustig, & 
Zacks, 2007) it is nevertheless puzzling that they are not 
compatible with the results of the former study (Chuderski 
& Nęcka, 2012), which was based on exactly the same 
methodology (see also: Chuderski et al., 2012). Here, we 
suggest an explanation of this discrepancy. It is possible 
that fluid intelligence is developing not only in terms of its 
general level, or efficiency, but also in terms of the nature 
of cognitive processes involved in human intellectual 
functioning. In other words, quantitative individual 
differences in Gf, reflected by IQ tests scores, may 
depend on qualitative differences in the type of cognitive 
processes forming intellectual capabilities of the person. 
For some people, storage capacity may be more important 
as a determinant of Gf, whereas others probably capitalize 
on executive functions, including inhibitory control. It 
seems that adults are rather dependent on storage capacity 
(Chuderski & Nęcka, 2012; Chuderski et al., 2012) but 
the category of control-dependent persons may be over-
represented among school-age children.
Let us look at the obtained results from the perspective 
of the theory of cognitive development. Children at the 
age between 10 and 13 years are in a very specific point 
of the developmental trajectory. On the one hand, their 
level of general fluid intelligence is not steady yet, since 
the IQ stabilization takes place in early adulthood (Belsky, 
1990; Li, Lindenberg, Hommel, Aschersleben, Prinz, & 
Baltes, 2004). So, there is still “something to be gained” 
in order to enter a higher level of intellectual development. 
On the other hand, executive control is still developing 
among children of this age (Duckworth et al., 2014), 
although the pace of development is slower than the one 
Table 3. Zero-order correlation coefficients for the sub-sample of accurate participants, N = 45
ERR n = 1 HIT n = 2 ERR n = 3 RPM TCT–DP


















RPM – – – – .10
p = .33
Note:
ERR – error rate, proportion of false alarms 
HIT – hit rate, proportion of properly detected signals
RPM – Raven’s Progressive Matrices
TCT–DP – Urban and Jellen’s Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production
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observed between three and six years of age (Rothbart 
& Rueda, 2005; Rueda et al., 2005). It is estimated that 
executive control stabilizes only in young adulthood, that 
is, between 18 and 25 years of age (Casey et al., 2008). 
Consequently, between 10 and 13 years of age children 
are still developing their executive functions, and the 
range of individual differences in executive control must 
be substantial. In other words, children at this stage of 
cognitive development must cope with the problems 
caused by underdeveloped executive control, particularly 
– inhibitory control (Steinberg, 2007, 2010). The better one 
copes, the higher he/she scores on IQ tests, and probably 
also on other measures of higher-order cognition. This 
line of theorizing implies that individual differences 
in Gf are predicted by those cognitive functions that 
are the most problematic for the particular population. 
If inhibitory control is problematic for pre-adolescent 
children, individual differences in cognitive control must be 
fundamental in accounting for individual differences in Gf. 
Normally functioning adults are probably less dependent on 
executive control, therefore, in their case, it is the storage 
capacity that counts much more as the predictor of Gf.
The ability to inhibit prepotent albeit inaccurate 
responses seems very important for complex reasoning 
tasks that reflect fluid intelligence. Inhibitory control 
prevents a person from acceptance of inappropriate 
solutions based on superficial similarities among the task’s 
elements. Fluid intelligence is rooted in the ability to grasp 
and utilize deep similarities, relations, or analogies defining 
the task’s structure (Cattell, 1971; Spearman, 1927). If 
a person is unable to grasp such relations, he/she will not 
be capable to deal with novel and complex problems, which 
is the core of general fluid intelligence. It may happen, 
though, that a person is in fact capable enough to grasp 
abstract relations but he/she is “lured” by more salient 
yet irrelevant aspects of the task’s structure. Therefore, 
inhibitory control over the “lures” must be viewed as 
a precondition of intelligent behavior. Maybe this factor 
is less important for adult mature intelligence but it seems 
crucial for school-age children whose intelligence is still 
quickly developing.
It must be underscored that our study suffers from 
certain weaknesses and limitations that undermine 
conclusiveness of its results. The sample was not very 
large compared to similar studies, including the ones 
that inspired us (Chuderski & Nęcka, 2012; Chuderski et 
al., 2012). Moreover, almost half of the sample did not 
fulfill the accuracy criterion we have established for the 
selection of participants. After preliminary analyses on the 
whole sample we decided to exclude participants who did 
not respond above the chance level. It appeared that 41 
participants out of 96 had to be excluded. Nevertheless, 
both the whole sample and the reduced subsample provided 
similar results, in spite of the reduction of degrees of 
freedom and inevitable loss of statistical power. Finally, 
we applied just one computerized task instead of a kind of 
small battery of tasks allowing assessment of two aspects of 
working memory: storage capacity and executive control. 
This decision resulted from the necessity to protect children 
from excessive amount of work and fatigue as a very likely 
consequence of increasing the number of tasks. Still, this 
decision, plus relatively small sample size, excluded the 
possibility to apply the latent variable approach, which 
might have brought about stronger and better-defined 
relationships between investigated constructs. In future 
replications, it would be advisable to increase the sample 
size and to make the working memory tasks friendlier for 
school-age children, in the hope to reduce the mean error 
rate.
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